Russia\u27s Perceptions of China\u27s Rise and its Impact on the Russian-Chinese Economic Cooperation by 馬 紅梅 et al.
松 山 大 学 論 集
第 ２４ 巻 第 ６ 号 抜 刷
２０１３ 年 ２ 月 発 行
Russia’s Perceptions of China’s Rise and its Impact
on the Russian-Chinese Economic Cooperation
Hongmei Ma
Russia’s Perceptions of China’s Rise and its Impact
on the Russian-Chinese Economic Cooperation
Hongmei Ma*
Introduction
As Trenin wrote that“the rise of China to the status of world power is the
principal cause of the changes in the entire geometry of international relations”
（Trenin［２０００］p.３９）. China’s rise confronts Russia with many challenges, while
also offering several opportunities. How to adequately respond to the challenges
and how to successfully take advantage of the opportunities require a fundamental
rethinking of Moscow’s foreign policy, as well as major adjustments of its domestic
policies.
Over the past three decades, the evolution of Russian-Chinese relations has
been one of the most significant changes in world politics. After nearly three
decades of confrontation, the two countries improved their relationship in the latter
half of１９８０s. In１９９４, the bilateral relationship was officially announced as a
constructive partnership. In １９９６ the two countries upgraded their constructive
partnership to a strategic partnership（Garnett［２００１］p.４４）. Followed in２００１, the
Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, signed by Russian
President Putin and his counterpart Jiang Zemin, codified the bilateral ties and the
＊ This paper is based on the research financed by Matsuyama University Special Research Fund
for FY２０１１ and the Grant-in-aid for Scientific Research（A） from Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science（Grant number２３２５１００３）.
future of the essential equality of the two states. The Russian-Chinese strategic
partnership has considerably broadened and deepened. Some speculate that the past
enmity has been replaced by a new amity with the“Russian-Chinese strategic axis”
（Bilveer［１９９８］）. On the other hand, some perceive the Russian-Chinese
relationship as something as an“axis of convenience”plagued by“fear, anxiety, and
mistrust”, which is ultimately“of secondary importance”（Lo［２００８］pp.３５－３６）.
Indeed, the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership has many aspects :
cooperation, competition, and needless to say, ambiguity. In recent years, with the
further development of both countries, the Russian-Chinese economic ties have
expanded substantially. New geopolitics and geo-economic are changing the
context of the Russian-Chinese relationship.
This study focuses on a rather modest issue : how does Russia perceive the rise
of China ? How do Russia’s perceptions influence the bilateral economic
relationship ? After briefly reviewing Russia’s different perceptions of the China
threat and the origins of them, this study tries to explain the ambivalent attitude of
Russia toward Russian-Chinese Economic Cooperation, especially toward the cross-
border cooperation between the Russian Far East（RFE）and Chinese Northeastern
Region by highlighting Russian economic and security concerns in that region.
Finally, this study proposes, from a researcher’s viewpoint, an approach to
ameliorate real or imaginary threat perceptions.
１ The Rise of China as an opportunity
As Vladimir Putin once said, the breakup of the Soviet Union is“the greatest
geopolitical tragedy of the２０th century”（China Daily, April２６,２００５）. During
the １９９０s, the newborn Russia lost its superpower status, weakened and was
struggling with problems of domestic transition and development, as well as Islamic
insurgency. It also confronted with assertive and dangerous international rivals
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from a position of disadvantage. Under Putin’s presidency, Russia started its
revival ; nevertheless, its achievements remain fragile and insignificant.
Russian perspectives on international relations more broadly tend to traditional
realpolitik considerations of the dynamics between the rise and fall of great powers
（Kuchins［２０１０］p.３５）. Regarding the future international power distribution for
the first２０ years of the２１st century, there are four points of consensus in the
Russian policy cycle :  The U. S. will continue to be the predominant power for at
least the next２０ years. Its major goal is achieving to keep its superpower status ;
 Within the next ２０ years, China will double its GDP and rise up as a
superpower ;  Russia will remain as a great power in a state of recovery. If it
does not succeed in its recovery, Russia may lose it great power status ;  the next
２０ years will be the key moment for the competition between unipolar politics and
multipolar politics, none of the states has the capability to resist the unilateralism of
the U. S. Therefore, based on these aforementioned assumptions, the U. S. and
China will be the two main focuses in Russian foreign policy for the next twenty
years. The U. S. is the first focus because Russia has to counterbalance it at the
very time the power gap between the two countries is widening, and Russia will not
be able to confront the U. S. on an equal footing. China is the second focus
because China can be used to counterbalance the U. S.’ dominance in international
politics（Wu［２００５］p.５３）. In the international arena, China has a common point
with Russia to constrain, －if not balance－, U. S. unilateral power and to promote
a multipolar world order. Both countries support the principle of non-interference
in domestic politics and emphasize on a multipolar world governed by international
laws through international organizations rather than superpower diktat in several
Russian-Chinese joint statements.
At the same time, Russia is not willing to become dependent on Beijing.
Russian leaders are not comfortable with the idea of a partnership with China in
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which Russia would be the junior partner and China, the dominant partner.
Moscow will not run any risk to confront the U. S. in case of clash between the U.
S. and China. Therefore, Moscow will simply continue to pursue tactical
cooperation, but not strategic alliance, with China.
In the next２０ years, Russia will make the best use of China’s rise in the
following four domains :  to prevent the U. S. from controlling international
organizations centered on the UN. For Russia, UN is still the most important
international organization where it holds a veto right in the Security Council. The
decision to use force against Serbia outside the UN Security Council’s jurisdiction in
March１９９９ signaled the power of the Western-centric world. Russia emphasizes
the centrality of the UN and will not let the U. S. take the leadership in the UN
reform. Russia and China are determined to cooperate to prevent an UN controlled
by the U. S.（Tsygankov［２０１２］p.２）. This cooperation also applies to other
international political, economic and cultural organizations which are considered as
representatives of the western countries’ interests.
 To strengthen the Russian-Chinese cooperation in regional organizations.
The power shift is occurring in the Central Asia, Korean peninsula and Middle East.
The U. S. is taking every opportunity to penetrating its forces everywhere. For
example, in the aftermath of９／１１, the U. S. established a network of jumping off
bases across Central Asia. The apparent rationale has been the fight against
terrorism and support for its military operations in Afghanistan. However, nearly at
the same time and particularly when Washington reached a rapprochement with India
and strengthened military co-operation with India, these developments in Central
Asia and South Asia are often interpreted as being motivated by containment of
Russia and China. The political changes in Georgia, Ukraine and Kirgizstan which
used to be considered as the backyard of Russia, have shown how powerful the U.
S.’ penetration could be. Naturally, to counterbalance the U. S., Russia needs
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support from China.
 To prevent the international disarmament mechanism from being controlled
by the U. S. Since the end of the cold war, the U. S. took the leadership in the
disarmament mechanism. For instance, in recent years, Russia and China have
demanded a ban on the use of weapons in space, signaling a shared effort to
challenge America’s military superiority（Kommersant, February１２,２００８）.
 To take the“China Express”to develop Russia’s own economy. Russian
government’s main goal is to develop its economy in the next２０ years. Russia
expects to expand economic cooperation with China and makes efforts to integrate
the RFE with China’s Northeastern economy and further integrate into the Asia-
Pacific economy. Specifically, by meeting China’s demands for energy and other
resources, Russia expects to diversify its export destinations.
２ Russia’s perceptions of threats from China
２．１ Different Perceptions of the China Threat
From the middle of the １９９０s, the idea that China, as a rising power
representing a source of regional and international instability, the so-called“China
threat”has periodically been voiced by the Chinese watchers in Russia. The China
threat perception is multi-dimensional : a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity,
demographic expansions and exploitation of Russia’s resources.
As the Russian-Chinese relationship improved in the beginning of the１９８０s,
both governments agreed to restart the border trade which had been stopped for more
than two decades. The growing prospects for economic cooperation were met with
great enthusiasm in the Russian border regions. Both local elites and the population
in general hoped to take advantage of their close proximity to China, and to gain
from the development of the border trade and direct contact with the authorities and
businesses of neighboring Chinese provinces. This interaction flourished during the
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last years of the existence of the Soviet Union as a result of the elimination of visa
requirements for business trips and other measures. The border that had been
closed for decades finally reopened. However, this early enthusiasm soon changed
to apprehension（Lukin［２００２］p.９１）. Poor regulation on both sides enabled
criminals and unscrupulous business people to take advantage of the sudden opening
of the border. The new markets catering to the shuttle trade soon became
associated with criminal activities. According to Minakir, criminal activity in the
border region peaked in１９９２, and was popularly attributed to the growing influx of
Chinese（Minakir［１９９６］）. “The uncontrolled flow of Chinese traders and laborers,
some of whom stayed in Russia for a long time or even settled there, revived the
old fears, in those under populated Far Eastern regions of the possibility of
Sinofication of these territories”（Lukin［２００２］p.９２）. Chinese labor migration
into the RFE is perceived as a threatening consumption of Russia’s own land,
population, and resources. In an opinion poll conducted in the RFE,５０percent of
inhabitants answer that they believe that in１０years ahead in the future, the Chinese
population will rise up from２０ percent to４０ percent in the RFE. ２０ percent of
inhabitants answer that the percentage could rise up from４０ percent to６０ percent
（Alekseev［２００１］pp.１－２）.
Actually, this perception is based on the population imbalance of Northeastern
China and the RFE. On the Chinese side, three provinces have more than １００
million people, on the Russian side, the total population in the RFE is declining
rapidly from８ million in１９９０ to６．４ million in２０１０, due to migration to the
European Russia. High unemployment rate, relatively low income comparing with
other regions, shorter life expectancy in the RFE, these deeply entrenched problems
are pushing people in the RFE to move. This exodus of local population and
incoming Chinese is arousing concerns for the Russian people.
Opinion poll in２００７ shows that４４ percent Russians think that the growth of
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no
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44%
39%
17%
India
Vietnam
North Korea
Indonesia
China
South Korea
Japan
Difficult to say
21%
26%
30%
16% 1 %
1 %
3 %
2 %
China is a threat to Russia’s interests（Figure１）. In a survey about Russian Views
on their Asian Neighbors, the results show that Russians prefer Japan to China
（Figure２）. And in the same survey, attitudes towards China showed no clear
improvements between２００５and２００７（Table１and Table２）.
Figure１: Russian Population : Do You Think That the Growth of China
is a Threat to Russian Interests ?（Oct．２００９）
Source : Russian polling institute FOM, http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d４３kitay.pdf
Russian Analytical Digest ,２００７, No.２５p.１４
Figure２: Who, in Your opinion, Should Become the Main Partner of
Russia in South-East Asia ?
Source : Russian polling institute FOM, http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d４３kitay.pdf
Russian Analytical Digest ,２００７, No.２５p.１２
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Of course, attitudes towards Chinese workers, traders and other migrants
clearly do not determine the future success or failure of regional cooperation and
development in the RFE and China’s Northeast region. Even so, prior experience
demonstrates that negative attitudes towards Chinese migration have the potential to
disrupt potential for increasing economic cooperation. As discussed above, regional
relations were plagued by distrust, in large part prompted by the chaos and
Positive More likelypositive
More likely
negative Negative
Difficult
to say
A. More goods from China are
appearing in our shops
２００５ １１％ ２３％ ３５％ ２７％ ４％
２００７ １１％ ２５％ ３５％ ２１％ ８％
B. Entrepreneurs and companies
from China are acquiring
property in Russia
２００５ ５％ ９％ ３６％ ４６％ ４％
２００７ ２％ ７％ ３７％ ４８％ ６％
C. There are more and more
workers from China in our
country
２００５ ４％ １０％ ３６％ ４５％ ５％
２００７ ３％ １２％ ３７％ ４１％ ７％
Yes More likelyyes
More likely
no No
Difficult
to say
A. Import of goods from China
to Russia
２００５ ２９％ ３２％ ２４％ １１％ ４％
２００７ ２２％ ３５％ ２９％ ７％ ７％
B. Acquiring of property in
Russia by Chinese entrepreneurs
２００５ ４５％ １９％ １４％ １９％ ３％
２００７ ４３％ ３１％ １２％ ８％ ６％
C. Free movement of workers
from China to Russia
２００５ ４３％ ２６％ １５％ １３％ ３％
２００７ ３８％ ３４％ １４％ ７％ ７％
Table１: What is your Attitude Towards the Following Questions ?（one answer for each
point）
Table２: Do You Think the Following Should Be Limited Or Not ? . .（one answer for
each point）
Source : Russian Attitudes towards China（VTsIOM Survey）,“How would you regard the current
relationship Between the Russian and Chinese peoples ?”, July２３－２４,２００５, Russian
Analytical Digest,２００７, No.２５p.１５.
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mismanagement of the border opening. It enhanced the sense of nationalism rather
than strengthen regional labour market integration. Chinese labour migration had
the effect of heightening fears of a“quiet expansion”（Wishnick［２００１］p.８０９）.
The third factor contributing to the China threat perception is the China’s needs
for resources. The resources located in the RFE and Siberia are enormous, with
world leading concentrations of petroleum, natural gas, strategic mineral deposits,
and forestal resources. Since free market reforms were implemented in １９７８,
China’s GDP has grown an average９．９ percent a year. China is tapping into a
variety of resource markets to feed their ever growing economy. China’s intent is
not to compete on the open market for natural resources, but to own them and their
associated infrastructure to create a secure source of supply. Thus, in this logic,
some Russians think that if China cannot get enough energy, it might invade the
RFE.
２．２ Factors contributing to the Chinese threat perceptions
In response to the arguments about the threats caused by China, the Chinese
government has reiterated that  China will solve the unsettled border issues with
Russia through negotiation, as a peace-loving county and that it will never invade
another country ;  China’s migrants in Russia are mainly shuttle traders, they will
return to China eventually. Chinese government does not have a population
expansion plan, and it agrees to co-operate with Russian government on the border
control and visa issues.  China will seek energy and resources through mutual
beneficial agreements according to the international rules. However, the China
threat issue is far from being alleviated, because the origins of the China threat
theory are deep-rooted（Wu［２００５］p.５４）.
First, the shadow of history cannot be simply erased. It is a heavy
psychological burden for the Russians that the land of the RFE used to belong to
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China. The arrival of Chinese traders recalled the historical memory of Russian-
Chinese clashes. History has played a crucial role in the formation of Russia’s
perceptions of the“China threat”. Unfortunately, its impact has been almost
entirely negative. The encounter dates back to the１７th century, with the expansion
of the Russian and Chinese empires eastward and northward, respectively. Russia
and China signed the １６８９ Treaty of Nerchinsk after several clashes. Russia
renewed its inroads into China’s periphery later through military operations,
diplomatic treaties and commercial expansion. The１８６０Treaty of Beijing opened
China’s entire northern frontier to Russia. As a result of Russia’s, Europe’s and
Japan’s infringement on China, the nineteenth century was seen by Chinese as a
century of“humiliation”（Yu［２００５］p.２２９; Lo［２００８］p.２１）. During the１９２０
s, Stalin instigated the independence of Outer Mongolia which was China’s suzerain.
The Russian-Chinese border was a legacy of various treaties in which Russia
gained over１million km２ of territory in Manchuria at China’s expense, and another
５００，０００km２ in the western regions. These treaties have long been regarded by
Chinese as unequal treaties, and the issue arose again with the Sino-Soviet split.
Sino-Soviet border negotiation failed in１９６４. Mao Zedong made a statement in
July１９６５which was considered by the Soviet side as a claim of１．５million square
kilometers of Soviet territory. Those tensions eventually lead to division-scale
military clashes along the border in１９６９. The conflict created unforgettable painful
memories for both countries. As Lukin commented,“Perhaps for the first time in
the history of Russian-Chinese relations, the awareness of the danger of having a
vast, densely populated and hostile neighbor in the east permeated public opinion,
not only in the border areas, but over the entire country”（Lukin［２００２］p.９０）.
During the thirty years of Russia-Chinese confrontation, the RFE was the frontier.
The disagreements and misunderstandings that destroyed the Sino-Soviet alliance in
the１９５０s have generated an undercurrent of mistrust that endures to this day. It
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would be naïve to think that those historical memories would be dismissed after a
few years of friendship and cooperation which only started from the late１９８０s.
The“unequal treaties”left a territorial question which remains unfinished business.
Even though Moscow and Beijing have agreed on formal demarcation of the border,
Beijing’s hardline policy toward Taiwan, especially its rejection to abandon the
threat of military force, has strengthened the image of China as a war prone state.
This has led some Russians to believe that Beijing will turn its attention to
recovering the RFE after it has completed Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland
（Rozman［２００７］p.３６２）.
Secondly, the gap between Russia and China is widening. Even though both
countries are in the“BRICs” group, their economic performances are not the same.
Neil MacFarlane challenged whether Russia is an emerging power and is qualified to
be in the“BRICs”group（MacFarlane［２００６］）. China has surpassed Russia in
GDP and trade volume. And China is catching up with Russia rapidly in terms of
living standard, educational level and military power. There is a growing
recognition of Russia’s weakness on the Russia’s side（Kuhrt［２０１２］p.４７３）. For
Russia, China’s historical role as“little brother”or“junior partner”has made it
hard to adjust to the reality of a China which is more powerful economically. From
the markets of the RFE to those in the metropolis of Moscow, Chinese consumer
goods and Chinese traders are constant reminders of the rise of China.
Thirdly, China’s errors and mistakes fuelled the“China threat”. Chinese
government failed to control the illegal border-crossing and the activities of shuttle
traders. High demand from China triggered illegal logging and illegal fishing which
also contributes to environmental degradation in the form of deforestation and
looting of protected stocks（Lukin［２００９］p.１０７）. Although these problems are
caused as much by corrupt Russian officials seeking bribes as by Chinese criminal
economic activity, Russia likes to blame China’s failure to regulate such activities.
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２．３ China’s threat at the other extreme : China collapse
While Russia is concerned about the dangers of China’s rise, there are also
arguments about the potential of threat of a weakened China or the uncertainty of
China’s development.
First, despite China’s success in obtaining formidable economic growth, some
scholars cast doubts on its highly administrated economic development model based
on export and investment which might not be sustainable. Chinese economy will
eventually run into a dead end, an event which will have major implications for
Russia’s national security interests. In sum, a frail, unstable China will not be in
Russia’s interest.
Secondly, there are tensions between the society and the state in China. Since
China has made little progress in its political reforms, there is a possibility that
poverty, awareness of wide economic inequalities, dissatisfaction with an
unresponsive and unaccountable government could create instability in China. If
the transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic system derails,
China could be trapped into chaos.
Thirdly, the Taiwan issue could explode. In the case of unification by force,
the U. S. might intervene ; therefore there might be a clash between the emerging
superpower and the incumbent superpower. In that case, America’s intervention
might bring political changes in China.
Fourthly, China is facing separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang. If
ethnic groups rise up and declare independence, and other provinces and regions
follow suit, China will collapse. Separatism in Tibet and Xinjiang could trigger
unrest in the Central Asia and threatening the security of Russia and Kazakhstan.
In conclusion, all these would mean big problems for Russia.
The Russians fear that the consequences of the explosion of these problems will
cause China’s disintegration. In other words, the Chinese government would lose
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its control and the country would degenerate into chaos. An exodus of Chinese
people would cross the border entering into the RFE. However, to the contrary,
most of the Chinese migrants in Russia only aim are to make quick money and then
go back home. Few of them would choose to live in Russia for a long period of
time, and even more to live there forever.
As David Lampton argues,“China is a giant screen upon which outsiders
project their hopes and fears. Expectations of economic gain coexist with worries
about financial crisis ; shrill alarms about Chinese power with dire forecasts of
collapse ; visions of democratic change with caricature of current reality. It is time
to step back and look where China is today and where it might be going, the
consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world”（Lampton［１９９８］）.
３ The ambivalent attitude of Russia toward Russian-Chinese
economic cooperation
The highly complementary economies of the two countries provide great
potential for trade, investment and energy cooperation. Still, despite some positive
trends it remains unclear whether Russia and China are able to realize the full
potential.
Russia has an obvious interest in sustaining economic growth by taking
advantage of its strengths－oil and gas exports to China, arms transfers to China ;
and tapping lucratively into China’s growing demand for nuclear power plants. On
the other hand, Russians have had many apprehensions regarding China. Oil and
gas exports to China help drive the furious pace of modernization, a modernization
fundamental to its transformation into a global power. The expanding Chinese
economic power could be a concern in the long term（Ma［２００７］）.
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３．１ Trade
Bilateral trade of ＄５７ billion in２００８ fell to ＄３９ billion in２００９ due to the
global financial crisis, and then rebounded back to ＄５９ billion in２０１０. For the
first time, China became Russia’s top trade partner. Nonetheless, Russian-Chinese
trade remains insufficient. The import of Russian goods in２００８ amounted to only
２．１ percent of China’s overall imports, while the average export of Chinese goods
to Russia was only２．２percent of China’s overall exports. The import of Chinese
goods in２００８ amounted to１３．２ percent of Russia’s total import, while the export
of Chinese goods to China was only４．３ percent of Russia’s overall exports. It is
obvious that Russia is more dependent on the bilateral trade than China. If the RFE
is singled out to calculate the dependency ratio, it would be as high as３０percent or
６０percent according to the oblast or krai.
Russian exports to China overwhelmingly consist of raw materials, especially
natural resources like oil and timber. Oil deliveries alone often account for half of
the value of all Russian exports to China. China mostly supplies machinery,
equipment and vehicles ; textiles and footwear ; metals and metal goods ; and
chemicals. The share of Russian manufactured goods in the overall imports to
China has plunged from about３０percent in１９９７to less than３percent in２００７.
Trade imbalance is another source of tension. The decline in Russian arms
purchased by China in recent years has shifted this balance significantly against
Russia. Before２００７, Russia recorded substantial surpluses from large deliveries of
energy, arms, and other industrial goods. Since then, the trade balance has
strikingly moved in China’s favor due to a decline in Chinese purchase of weapons
systems and other high-technology items and increase in the exports of machinery
and high-tech products（Asia Times, August１５,２００７）.
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３．２ Investment
Mutual investment is another lagging area of cooperation that has attracted the
attention of both governments. In２０１１, China’s direct non-financial investment in
Russia amounted to only ＄３００million, which itself represented just０．５percent of
China’s total investment（Asia Times, March ２３,２０１２）. By the end of ２０１１,
China’s accumulative non-financial direct investment in Russia was only ＄３．１
billion. Most Chinese non-financial capital flows into Russia’s textile, timber, and
raw materials sector. Russia and China have outlined, but not yet achieved, a
Russian-Chinese Investment Cooperation Plan, designed to expand their mutual
cooperation in investment and financing.
Russian ministries try to persuade China and Japan to set up venture businesses
in manufacturing sector in the RFE, but in economic terms it makes little sense to
invest there : the total population of the RFE has decreased to only６．４million, and
the market is very limited. The transportation fee is very high to ship the goods to
European Russia ; it makes more sense to build a car factory in European Russia so
that cars can be sold there or exported to other European countries.
Russia’s concerns about“Chinese economic expansion”have continuously been
a hot issue among the Russian power elite against Chinese investment in the
resources sector. It is in this context that the Russians have been reluctant to
encourage Chinese investment in hydrocarbon fields in Eastern Russia. China’s
involvement in upstream projects has been limited to only economically doubtful
ones. Examples include the Vostok Energy joint-venture company’s investment in
Zapadnochonsky and Verkhnechersky mining deposits in the Irkutsk region, which
possess only small volumes of oil and gas resources. Even though the Vostok
Energy joint-venture company was established by the Russian oil company Rosneft
which held a５１percent stake, and China National Petroleum Corporation（CNPC）
（Itoh［２０１０］p.１０）.
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The agricultural sector badly performed in Russia. Lands lay unused For the
Chinese farmers, the unused land is an opportunity. According to the Russian Law,
foreigners cannot own Russian land, however, they can lease land for a maximum
of４９years. There is significant political resistance to accept an increased number
of Chinese farmers. Russia prefers to lease land to Korea, Singapore and Vietnam
than China（Asia Times, March２,２０１２）.
３．３ Energy Cooperation
It seems that it is in the energy sector where lies a great promise of a lucrative
area in economic cooperation between Russia and China. As of ２００９, Russia
became the world’s largest producer of oil and second largest of natural gas, while
at the same time China exceeded the U. S. in２０１０ to become the world’s largest
energy consumer.
Given the geographic contiguity between the two countries which share a４，０００
kilometer border, the facts that Russia is the world’s largest oil producer, and China
is the world’s largest energy importer with the fastest growing appetite for energy, it
would seem that Russia and China would have cooperated sooner. Russia’s oil and
natural gas sediments, some of the largest in the world, lie much more nearby than
the remote energy reserves of the Persian Gulf and Africa. Oil and gas from these
regions can only arrive at China through international waters which are vulnerable to
the blocking by foreign navies and sea pirates, whereas Russian energy can enter
Chinese territory straightaway without having to be shipped through intermediate
territories.
In the last１０ years, Russia’s oil and gas companies have been searching to
diversify their energy export not only in the West, but in the East as well. Oil was
sent from Russia to China by trucks and trains, the transport fees are very expensive
and wasteful. To facilitate the oil delivery and to make it more cost-effective in the
４６ 松山大学論集 第２４巻 第６号
long term, as early as November１９９４, Russia advocated the construction of an oil
pipeline connecting Angarsk in Russia to Daqing in China. After many years of
flawed hopes and halted agreements, China and Russia have made only little
progress in building their long-anticipated energy partnership.
Despite these complementarities, it was not until ２００９ that Russia became
China’s fourth largest oil supplier, furnishing７．８ percent of China’s imports in
２００９, rising up from６．３ percent in２００８. Still, this low figure is unbelievable
because the two countries would appear to be natural energy partners. Furthermore,
negotiations over a direct natural gas pipeline came to a standstill due to discordance
over what price China will pay for the gas.
In spite of these advantages and other mutual encouragements to expand
bilateral energy collaboration, the result has been astonishingly minimal. Technical
obstacles, controversy about prices, scarce transportation infrastructure, and mutual
distrust have historically kept Chinese purchases of Russian energy at relatively low
levels. Recurrent delays in transportation on the part of the Russians and attempts
to let the competing interests of the Chinese, Asian, and European markets play off
with each other have prevented Chinese policy makers from regarding Russia as a
trustworthy long-term partner. In assessing energy relations between the two
nations, it is important to discern real actual contracts from nothing but statements
of intention. A great deal of the bilateral contracts made in recent years－often
described as reminders of understanding or framework deals－had the only
objectives of signifying interest as well as gaining leverage regarding third parties,
such as Japan and Europe.
The Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to ２０３０, approved by the
Russian government in November２００９, defines a planned acceleration in exploiting
oil and gas resources in Eastern Russia, with the goal of exporting these products to
the Asia-Pacific region. The procedure specifies that Russia aims to expand the
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percentage of oil exports to the Asia-Pacific region, among its total oil exports,
from８percent in２００８to１４～１５percent in２０２０－２２and to２２～２５percent in２０３０
and that of natural gas exports from zero in２００８ to１６～１７percent in２０２０－２２and
to１９～２０percent in２０３０.
China provides the main consumer market for Russia’s eastern energy strategy.
China’s primary oil demand, for instance, is projected to increase by an average
annual growth rate of ３．３ percent in ２００７－２０３０, whereas that of the world is
predicted to be ０．９ percent（the reference scenario in the International Energy
Agency’s ２００９ World Energy Outlook）. Unlike the upsurge in China’s energy
demand, Japan’s energy demand has almost peaked with oil demand already on a
gradual decline.
Ironically, however, domestic voices have emerged expressing concern that the
swift expansion in the amount of energy provided to China might leave Russia as a
“resource appendage”, which reinforces its historical opponent. The share of crude
oil in Russia’s total exports to China increased from５percent in２０００ to４０percent
in２００８（Itoh［２０１０］p.９）.
Admittedly, it is true that the Russian government is currently struggling to
raise the share of value-added products rather than raw materials in the overall
structure of exports. Yet, the same kind of concern was never heard with regard to
the fact that crude oil accounted for４０percent of Russia’s total exports to Japan in
２００７.
Russia’s paranoia about China is based on a geopolitical mindset and has
prevented it from adopting a trusting attitude toward its“strategic partner”（Itoh
［２０１０］pp.９－１０）.
３．４ Arms trade
Russian-Chinese arms trade began in１９９２after Beijing was struck with a U. S-
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European arms blockage as a consequence of the１９８９Tiananmen Square Accident.
Since the two governments signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation in
December １９９２, Russia has been the main arms provider to China, and China
became the leading purchaser of Russian arms. For over１０years, Russian military
exports to China have turned out to be the most important dimension of the two
countries’ security relationship and the largest sector of Russian-Chinese trade.
China has bought more weapons platforms and hardware-related items from Russia
than from all other countries.
Between the dissolution of the Soviet Union in１９９１ and２０１０, more than９０
percent of China’s imported major conventional weapons were supplied by Russia.
Since ２００７ there has been an impressive diminution in the volume of Chinese
weapons imports from Russia. Although the quantity of deliveries can alternate
abruptly from year to year, deliveries for２００８ remained at the same low level and
diminished further in２００９and２０１０. Anatoly Isaikin, director of Rosoboronexport
（the agency which is responsible for managing the Russian arms trade）recognized
that China’s share of Russian arms exports dropped to１０ percent in２０１０, when
Russia exported a record ＄８．６ billion worth of arms（Reuters, March９,２０１１）.
China which once was the largest importer of Russian arms, ranked behind India
and Algeria in２０１０. Then in２０１１, China ranked behind India and Vietnam in
２０１１（Figure３）.
For Russians in general, and for the Russian military establishment in
particular, China is a double-edged sword. One edge represents China’s capacity to
help Russia’s military-industrial complex to survive, but the other edge represents
the potential harm that a rising China might do to Russia. Military officers have
supported the sale of modern weapons but hedged against the risk of a future
conflict with their neighbor by withholding the latest military technologies（Ryan
［２０１０］p.１９２）.
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The rationale of such extensive arms sales to China has been pointed out in
Russia. As a matter of fact, many Russian analysts view China as a potential long-
term threat to Russia. In a December１９９６speech even Defense Minister Rodionov
let slip that China was a“potential threat”to Russia. Russian commanders in the
Transbaikal have complained that they face Russian-made Chinese aircraft in their
field of action in better state than their own. Likewise, Russian naval officers have
Figure３: The volume of Chinese arms imports from Russia, １９９２－２０１０
The bar graph shows annual totals and, to smooth out year-on-year fluctuations
in deliveries, the line graph shows the five-year moving average（plotted at the
last year of each five-year period）. The SIPRI trend-indicator value（TIV）is
a measure of the volume of arms transferred and not of financial values. For a
description of the TIV and its calculation see（http://www.sipri.org/databases/
arms transfers/background）.
Source : SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, http://www.sipri.org/databases/
armstransfers
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expressed displeasure that the destroyers sold to China would have been deployed by
the Russian fleet if economic conditions had allowed（Kuchins［１９９９］p.４４０）.
Russian defense manufacturers, however, indicate that the technologies being
sold to China are not on the cutting edge and that there is excessive paranoia,
particularly on the part of the Ministry of Defense Export Control Committee
（Komitet eksportnogo kontrolya－KEKMO）, about the quality of arms going to
China. A journalist Pavel Felgengauer points out that much of this cutting-edge
technology exists“only on the drawing boards or in experimental samples”
（Felgengauer［１９９７］）.
On the other hand, it is true that the systems sold to China, such as Su-２７s and
Kilo Class submarines, have been in production for over a decade and China has
expressed dissatisfaction with Russian reluctance to be more forthcoming with sales
of the latest technologies and systems. It is interesting to note that while Russia has
refused to supply the PLA with certain types of military equipment, such as the Tu-
２２M Backfire supersonic tactical strike bomber, it has been willing to sell them to
India（Tsai［２００３］p.１２５）. One conference participant suggested that this largely
reflects the fact that the Russian General Staff, which has to approve all weapons
sales, views Beijing as a potential threat, while holding no such suspicions about
New Delhi（Bellacqua［２０１０］pp.６－７）.
Decreasing dependence on Russian arms exports means that China has taken the
upper hand in the relationship, according to a report issued by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute（SIPRI）（Jakobson et al.［２０１１］）. Chinese
specialists frequently admit that Russia is drawing restrictions in the providing of its
most developed weapon systems and technology, assessing that the Russian military
would be eager to keep technological superiority over the Chinese superpower and
that Russia furnishes India with more developed gear and technology than China.
There is definitely a gap between the Russia-China and Russia-India military
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technical collaboration. There is no history of conflict between Russia and India,
whereas some Russian analysts who support restrictions in weapon deliveries to
China have enrooted in their memory the１９６９Sino-Soviet border conflict in which
Chinese army used weapons bought from the Soviet Union. However, this
apprehension remains discreet in mainstream Russian discourse, which underlines
that border disputes have been settled and that Chinese acquisitions are meant to be
used in the Taiwan Strait region and South China Sea. Likewise, mainstream
Chinese specialists do not foresee an open conflict with Russia. Nevertheless, some
Chinese analysts believe that the“China Threat”does weigh in Russian decision
making on whether to provide weapons and technology to its eastern neighbor
（Jakobson et al.［２０１１］p.２０）.
Russia and India have a friendly relationship and high levels of mutual
confidence that have been built over the years. Moreover, tighter connection with
India is perceived as a way of balancing against a rising China. In addition, while
Russian officials benefit from a major role in the cooperation with India, they are
more and more conscious of and unhappy with their minor role in Russian-Chinese
interactions（ibid.）.
３．５ Cross-border cooperation
Heilongjiang province in Northeast China plays a critical part in Russian-
Chinese trade relations. This province has been the longest and most economically
active border with Russia. In recent years nearly２０～２５ percent of bilateral trade
volume is coming from, or go to Heilongjiang province.
A flow of resolutions taken by the China’s central and local governments to
reinforce Russian-Chinese economic connection, in particular economic exchanges
across the border zones, was welcomed on the Russian side with a diversity of
responses.
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The Pogranichny－Suifenhe Trade and Industrial Complex opened in August
２００６. It was meant to become an important emblem of regional Russian-Chinese
economic integration. Alas, it has not been built according to what was planned.
From ２００４, in the Chinese side,１ billion RMB was invested by the Shanghai
Shimao group. The Chinese local governments and businessmen had hoped the
trade and industrial complex would be the core of a border economy which is
considered as a natural economic territory. By２００８, the Chinese side of the trade
zone had a luxurious Holiday Inn hotel, and a huge shopping mall. The original
planning also included a casino and factories. The objective of having people from
both countries to move without severe restraints in the Pogranichny－Suifenhe Trade
and Industrial Complex, however, could not be achieved because Russia did not
agree to let Chinese citizen to cross the border without a visa. On the Russian side
there are only a hostel and a church. Despite promises made at the Sino-Russian
Trade Forum in２００４, no major corporations have injected money there. In the
giant shopping mall, one can barely find more than a few Chinese merchants selling
Chinese consumer goods and Russia souvenirs to the Chinese tourists. Twice or
three times per hour, tourist bus arrives and tens of Russians would start shopping in
the mall. Then, one hour or so later, they will board back on the bus and leave.
Shop owners complain about the bad location of the complex because most tourists
prefer to do their shopping in the Suifenhe town rather than the complex which is２０
minutes away by taxi from the town.
Another example is the Heihe bridge project. Heihe and Blagoveshchensk are
twin cities which are only８００meters away, separated by the Amur River. Heihe
aims to facilitate trade and tourism by building a bridge. In the absence of a
bridge, in the summer, ferry and hovercraft are used to cross the river. In the
winter time, after the river is completely frozen, trucks and buses can pass on the
ice. There is the inconvenience that the Customs Checkpoint has to be closed twice
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a year, nearly２months during the periods of river freezing and ice breaking. The
negotiation about building a bridge started in the middle of１９９０s, however, more
than ten years have passed by, and there is still no bridge. There are two reasons
for the non-existence of the bridge : first, the Defense Ministry vetoed the plan for
reasons of national security. Secondly, the bridge has been hindered by the
involvement of a Russia private company. The current Customs Checkpoint of
Blagoveshchensk is in a building owned by a private company and that company
leased it to the Russian government to be used as Customs Checkpoint. In the case
of a new bridge being built, the Customs Checkpoint would have to move to the
end of the bridge which is supposed to be in the downstream, so that is why this
company lobbied against the bridge plan.
The procedures of passing the customs are time-consuming. On the Chinese
side of Heihe, the Customs Checkpoint, City Commercial Bureau, Health and
Sanitary Check Bureau, and the shipping agent companies are in the same building
in order to facilitate the trade. Chinese officials and businessmen are irritated by
the inefficiency of doing business with Russia. It takes even longer time for a truck
to pass the Russian customs inspection. Often, a truck loaded with goods passes
Customs of Heihe then goes to the Russia side and wait to be checked there.
Sometimes when the working hour on the Russia side is over, the trucks which have
not been inspected have to return to the Chinese side again. The local
transportation companies started to hire Russian drivers just to drive the trucks across
the river, saying that a Russian driver costs more but will save lots of time.
From those three examples, we can see that Russia still sets national security to
a higher priority than economic cooperation. Indeed, as Andreas has pointed out
that foreign economic penetration tends to raise the question for border areas, of
whether borders can perform“both as better security barriers and as efficient
economic bridges at the same time”or whether ensuring the continued operation of
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the border as an effective security barrier“may restrict its role as an efficient
economic bridge”（Andreas［２００３］p.９６）.
Concluding Remarks
There are a variety of paradoxes in Russia’s policy toward the economic
exchanges with China. It is true that, on the one hand, at the domestic level, and
in particular in a region such as the RFE, trans-border issues become hard to ignore.
On the other hand, threat perceptions and Great Power considerations cannot address
development issues of the RFE which are closely connected to the Northeastern
China and Northeast Asia.
The fear of becoming a“raw materials appendage” to China has hindered
cooperation at the local level ; Russia complains that China imports too much
resources from Russia, but not enough machinery products. As a matter of fact, in
２００５, oil, oil products, wood and pulp consisted of more than ８４ percent of
Russia’s total export to the world. Meanwhile, Russian machinery and
transportation equipment amounted to１．０ percent. Thus the overall structure of
Russian exports to China conformed to Russia’s global trade profile as a supplier of
raw materials, metals, and semi-processed goods（Ma［２００７］p.８５）. Yet, Russia
has never been heard complaining about being a raw materials appendage to Europe
or to Japan even though fuels and related materials accounted for７９percent of EU’s
imports from Russia and fuels and related materials accounted for７６ percent of
Japan’s imports from Russia in２０１０（European Commission［２０１２］; JETRO［２０１１］
p.１１）.
Another contradiction is that Russia’s economic and energy policies tend to
bolster the prominence of raw materials. Russia has shown its desire to gain the
status of“energy superpower”. Russia’s GDP, export and government budget is
heavily dependent on its oil and gas revenue. The overdependence on energy
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revenues has distorted the economy and has had broader repercussions at the
regional and domestic levels. Moreover, Russia stands alone as the only major
economy that hasn’t increased industrial production in the last２０years, while China
expanded its industrial production４．３ times between１９９４ and２００８. Industrial
workers make up only １６ percent of Russia’s workforce. Unemployment, low
income and shorter life expectancy in the RFE, these deeply entrenched problems
are still far from being solved.
Russia’s ambivalent attitudes towards China have greatly impeded its own
economic development in the RFE and turned out to be self-fulfilling. In other
words, to avoid being dependent on China, Russia tried to control the border, and
its own resources, etc. However, the geographic proximity with China and the
economic structure of the RFE has turned the bordering regions into a natural
economic territory. Without cooperation with China, the problems of the RFE will
remain unresolved. Therefore people there will continue to move out and the
population balance will worsen further across the border, the China Threat will grow
even bigger, and this will further impede the cooperation with China.
What is needed is cutting the Gordian’s knot. If Russia cannot overcome its
fear of China, it will not be able to benefit from the rise of China. To constrain a
potential hegemonic China or an imagined predatory China, closing its border or
stopping the economic exchanges is not a solution. In order to avoid an
overdependence on China or become a raw material appendage to China, Russia
needs to improve its relationship with other Asia-pacific countries, to get the
Russian-Chinese relationship enmeshed into a regional cooperation framework.
Only by developing the RFE, Russia can overcome its threat perceptions of China.
As Lampton said that“China is a giant screen”, when Russia looks at it, what it
sees is its own weaknesses.
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